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categories? Second: To what extent do jurors assign culpability in the manner
assumed by the Model Penal Code (MPC)?
In prior work, we challenged numerous assumptions underlying the
MPC mental state architecture, which divides guilty minds into four kinds:
purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent. Our experiments showed that
subjects had profound difficulty categorizing some of the mental states,
particularly recklessness, in the context of scenarios in which hypothetical
actors caused harmful results. And, when asked to punish hypothetical actors,
subjects punished knowing behavior and reckless behavior indistinguishably.
Here, we extend our prior work in two main ways. First, we show that
a person's ability to apply the MPC mental states is susceptible to subtle
variations in the language that defines and communicates them. For instance,
we demonstrate that using slightly different wording can significantly improve
participants' ability to accurately identify the mental state of recklessness
(notwithstanding that reckless and knowing mental states remain by far the
hardest to classify). Second, we show that even when people can see the mental
state distinctions that the MPC draws, they don't necessarily rank order the
mental states-by culpability level-in the order the MPC assumes.
These findings raise questions about the normative basis for the
knowing/reckless distinctionin the MPC's mental state hierarchyin the context
of result elements. Further,because even small changes in phrasingcanproduce
significant differences in juror evaluation, the findings raise genuine concerns
about the adequacy of MPC-based culpability instructions in criminal cases.
Our results suggest the need for a critical reexamination of the substantial
divide between the expectations and assumptions of drafters of criminal codes,
on one hand, and empirical reality, on the other.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To be guilty of a crime, generally one must commit a bad act
while in a culpable state of mind. But the language used to define,
partition, and communicate the variety of culpable mental states (in
Latin, mens rea) is crucially important. For depending on the mental
state that juries attribute to him, a defendant can be convicted-for the
very same act and the very same consequence-of different crimes, each
with different sentences.
The influential Model Penal Code ("MPC") of 1962 divided
culpable mental states into four now-familiar kinds: purposeful,
knowing, reckless, and negligent.' Both before the MPC and since,
scholars in criminal law and philosophy have actively debated how best
to define and apply the mens rea categories. 2 Yet few empirical studies
have explored the actual relationships between specific mens rea
formulations and legally relevant outcomes.
A 2011 article coauthored by several of us, Sorting Guilty Minds,
presented experiments that tested the MPC's twin assumptions that:
(1) ordinary people naturally do-or at least can, when instructeddistinguish these four categories of mental states with reasonable

1.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02 (1962).

LARRY ALEXANDER &KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009); Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretationand the

2.

See, e.g.,

Limits of Culpability's Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2012, at 109; Claire
Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 895 (2000); Douglas N. Husak, The
Sequential Principle ofRelative Culpability, 1 LEGAL THEORY 493 (1995); Paul H. Robinson & Jane

A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35
STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983); Kenneth W. Simons, Should The Model Penal Code's Mens Rea
ProvisionsBe Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179 (2003).
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reliability; and (2) holding the act and harm constant, the average
person would punish acts reflecting these four mental states in the
manner corresponding to the MPC hierarchy-that is, they would
punish purposeful conduct the most severely and negligent conduct the
least. 3
Those experiments found that these assumptions held, for the
most part. But an interesting and important exception emerged at the
boundary between knowing and reckless conduct: in sorting the mental
states and in assigning punishment, subjects were much less able to
differentiate between knowing and reckless conduct.
On the basis of those findings, the article outlined several
possible reforms-assuming the results were validated in future
studies. 4 To validate and extend those results, we have conducted a
series of additional experiments, reported here, with more than 1,600
additional subjects.
Two primary results emerge. First, we demonstrate that
modifying the language used to communicate mens rea can significantly
improve participants' ability to accurately identify the mental state of
recklessness. However, subject accuracy in identifying the reckless and
knowing mental states remains far below the classification accuracy for
the other mental states.
Second, notwithstanding the gains in sorting accuracy, our
subjects did not actually punish knowing and reckless behavior
differently. Our observation that improved sorting of knowing and
reckless mental states does not result in a corresponding distinction in
the punishment ratings of knowing and reckless behavior suggests that
subjects do not see a clear moral distinction between those two mental
states, at least in relation to the "result" element of offenses. These
findings raise, but do not fully answer, questions about the normative
basis for including the knowing/reckless distinction in the MPC's
mental state hierarchy in the context of result elements.
These findings also have implications for legal practice.
Legislatures and courts use a variety of words to define and
communicate mens rea. Typically overlooked is whether a particular
formulation of a mental state will matter for juror understanding and
decision-making. When jury instructions are reviewed on appeal,
judges have only their experience and intuition to guide them as to the
possible misunderstanding caused by particular wording. Our results
here suggest that juror decision-making is sensitive to the precise
3.
Francis X. Shen, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Joshua D. Greene & Ren6 Marois,
Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306 (2011). We will subsequently refer to this article as
the "original study."
4.
Id. at 1348.
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language of mens rea in ways that legal decision-makers may not
anticipate.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes our original
study in the context of what little existing empirical literature there is
on juror assessments of MPC mental states. Part II details the design
and results of the new experiments. Part III discusses the implications.
Two appendices provide additional details of the experiments, including
the full text of the scenarios used.
II. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The Model Penal Code, developed by the American Law Institute
in the mid-twentieth century, has been highly influential in shaping the
definition of mens rea terminology in state criminal codes and in
judicial opinions. 5 The vast bulk of the states-thirty-four of them 6 either have adopted or have been heavily influenced by the Model Penal
Code, which since 1962 has divided the universe of potential culpable
mental states into: purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent. 7 Even
codes that continue to use common law terms have been interpreted in
light of Model Penal Code concepts and definitions.8 Due to the MPC's
substantial and continued influence, scholars in criminal law and
philosophy have actively debated how best to define and apply the mens
rea categories. 9 However, surprisingly little research has examined how
laypeople-who are most commonly charged with applying the Model
Penal Code's mens rea provisions-actually interpret and apply the
Code.

5.
Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact:
Recklessness, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 540-41 (1988); Paul H.
Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctionsin Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 815-16
(1980); Robinson & Grall, supra note 2, at 691-703 (discussing MPC approach to elements
analysis); Simons, supra note 2, at 180-81.
6.
Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326 (2007).
7.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
8.
The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts also cite to the Model Penal Code with
some frequency. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. u. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 (2011)
(referencing the MPC to provide the appropriate definition for several mental state classifications
in an attempt to distinguish these mental states from the concept of willful blindness as it has
been articulated by the Courts of Appeals).
9.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 2; Brown, supra note 2; Finkelstein, supra
note 2; Husak, supra note 2; Robinson & Grall, supranote 2; Simons, supra note 2.
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A. Research on Mental State Attributions
Empirical research on the ability of laypeople to distinguish
specific mental states as required by law is only now emerging. 10 In
1992, researchers at the University of Washington investigated how
students interpret and apply the legal definition of four culpable mental
states:

purpose

("P"),11

knowledge

("K"),

recklessness

("R"),

and

negligent ("N"). 12 They found that subjects could only distinguish
between the extremes of P and N. Subjects could not reliably
distinguish in the middle of the hierarchy: P vs. K, P vs. R, K vs. R, K
vs. N, and R vs. N. 13
Jury instructions made no difference in subjects' ability to make
these distinctions. When subjects were asked to assign punishment
ratings, these ratings again did not differentiate between any mental
states aside from the extremes of P and N. This result held true both
for those subjects who did not have the legal definitions provided and
for those who did. 14
Also in the early 1990s, legal scholar Paul Robinson and
psychologist John Darley ran a series of experiments that, in contrast
10. Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
317, 320-21(2009):
[C]ontemporary criminal law requires jurors to be latter-day Kreskins-to not only
reliably distinguish nearly indistinguishable mental states, but also to accurately
determine which of many possible mental states the defendant actually possessed at
the time of the crime. Is such mindreading possible? . . . Given the centrality of mens
rea to criminal responsibility, we would expect legal scholars to have provided a
persuasive answer to this question. Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the
truth.
Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State ofMind InquiriesIgnore PsychologicalReality
and Overlook CulturalDifferences, 49 How. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) ("Scholars have not yet ... empirically
examined the psychological mechanisms involved in understanding others' minds in the legal
setting."). For a more detailed discussion of these studies, see Shen et al., supra note 3, at 132026.
11.
The authors of the 1992 study used the term "intent" to refer to the mental state category
that we reference as purpose in the present work. Because they convey the same legal significance,
we refer to the category as purpose (I"P) throughout. We also use a blameless ("B") condition to
signal the absence of a culpable mental state.
12.
Laurence J. Severance, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Inferring the Criminal
Mind: Toward a Bridge Between Legal Doctrine and Psychological Understanding, 20 J. CRIM.
JUST. 107 (1992). Surprisingly, this study has to date been cited only once within the Westlaw JLR
database.
13.
The researchers found that, when rank-ordering mental states, "legally nalve subjects
could not, on their own, reliably agree on differentiation between 'criminal knowledge' and
,criminal recklessness' nor reliably distinguish these from other legally relevant mental states."
Id. at 115.
14. In addition, Severance et al. carried out a content analysis of subject-generated mental
state definitions. They sought to determine, qualitatively, the extent to which subjects' definitions
of the mens rea terms varied from the legal definitions. The researchers found that subjects often
had their own set of preconceptions that deviated from the legal concepts of mens rea. Id. at 114.
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to the 1992 study, found that individuals do typically assign liability
and punishment in a manner generally consistent with the MPC. 15 As
summarized by Robinson and Darley, "[T]he responses of our
subjects ... assign a higher degree of liability to the knowing versus the
reckless commission of all offenses." 16
A decade after the Robinson and Darley study, law professor
Justin Levinson conducted an experiment that explored the mediating
role of culture in the assessment of defendants' mental states.17 While
the primary objective of the study was to assess cultural differences in
assessments of mental states and culpability, Levinson noted that even
across cultures, in the majority of the scenarios the responses provided
did not match the responses predicted by the MPC. 18
Most recently, in 2012, psychologists Pam Mueller and John
Darley and legal scholar Lawrence Solan published a study examining
mental states and punishment in civil disputes.19 The study used as its
centerpiece a series of vignettes based on a case in which a workman is
electrocuted while attempting an emergency repair job. 20 The
researchers manipulated the level of knowledge that the employer had
about the employee's risk of being electrocuted.
The primary finding of the study was that "not only do people
regard the side effects of knowing acts as intentional when assigning
liability, but they also regard the side effects of reckless acts as
intentional when making liability judgments." 2 1 This is consistent with
findings in moral psychology that subjects tend to characterize known
negative side effects, but not positive side effects, as intended. 22
The researchers then followed up by running an additional
experiment manipulating the perceived level of risk (as communicated

15.

PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME (1995).

16. Id. at 87.
17.
Levinson, supra note 10, at 2-3.
18. Only when averaging over all four fact patterns does Levinson find some evidence that
'participants maintained a folk mental state hierarchy," placing "purpose above knowledge above
recklessness" in their punishment ratings. Id. at 20. But these results were not robust, as they did
not hold in each fact pattern when analyzed individually. Id. at 21.
19. Pam A Mueller, Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, When Does Knowledge Become
Intent?: Perceiving the Minds of Wrongdoers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 859, 859 (2012). The
researchers asked, "[W]hen judging behavior, do people distinguish between intentional and
knowing acts, knowing and reckless acts, reckless and negligent acts, and so on?" Id.
20. Id. at 865 (noting that "[t]he scenarios are based loosely on Parretv. Unicco Service Co.
(2005), a case decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma").
21. Id. at 875.
22. Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in OrdinaryLanguage, 63 ANALYSIS
190, 193 (2003); Thomas Nadelhoffer, Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions:
Some Problems for JurorImpartiality, 9 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 203 (2006).
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by percentage likelihood of the employee injury occurring). 2 3
Noteworthy from the results was the finding that-even with only a 3%
perceived likelihood of the harm occurring-35% of subjects (when
given the reckless treatment) concluded that the employer acted
intentionally. 24
Summarizing these empirical studies as a whole, it is apparent
that there is much variation in jurors' abilities to accurately assess
defendants' mental states. Methodological limitations in previous
studies may explain this variation, including study designs in which
experimental subjects were exposed to repeated variations of the same
fact patterns as well as differences in subject pools across the studies. 25
B. Sorting Guilty Minds: Summary of Results
In our original study, 26 we exposed subjects to a series of short,
unique scenarios, each of which was designed to be straightforward and
reasonably believable on its face, clearly communicative of a distinct
MPC mental state, and concise enough so that subjects could read
multiple scenarios within a reasonable time. 27 Moreover, because
previous research has pointed to the interaction of harm level with
mental state determinations and because the MPC and many states
place differential importance on the mental state boundaries depending
on the severity of the offense, we also varied the harm level across our
scenarios.28

23.
The risk levels used were 3, 20, 50, 80, 97, and 100%, respectively.
24. Mueller et al., supra note 19, at 888. The researchers conducted additional studies to
determine whether the type of knowledge held by the employer affected intentionality judgments.
They found that "knowing who is going to be injured, at least within a limited population, is
irrelevant to judgments of intentionality; knowing when someone is going to be injured is relevant
to intentionality judgments; and knowing how someone is going to be injured is essential for
perceiving intentionality." Id.
25. For additional discussion of these issues, see Shen et al., supra note 3, at 1324-26.
26. In the present Article, when we refer to "we" in reference to this 2011 study, we are
referring only to the subset of the current authorship who coauthored the original study.
27. These constraints raised a number of questions about how to effectively and efficiently
communicate the protagonist's motivation and intent. John's action in each of our scenarios was
explained to subjects with a simple, and typically neutral, motivation. For instance, in one
scenario, subjects read that John acted because he was angry after an argument with a player on
an opposing softball team. Scenario construction was also sensitive to the fact that, as found in
research by philosopher Thomas Nadelhoffer, moral judgments about the actor involved may
influence mental state assessment. Nadelhoffer, supra note 22, at 203.
28. For a discussion of the relationship between judgments of intentionality and harm

caused, see Joshua Knobe, The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk
Psychology, 130 PHIL. STUD. 203 (2006), and Edouard Machery, The Folk Concept of Intentional
Action: Philosophicaland Experimental Issues, 23 MIND & LANGUAGE 165 (2008).
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Applying these principles, we drafted scenarios featuring a
protagonist (always named John) whose actions resulted in various
levels of harm, which we categorized into three levels. 29 We organized
the individual scenarios within "themes." For purposes of this
discussion, we use the term "theme," which is akin to previous
researchers' "stem," to refer to the general fact pattern. Each theme had
five variants, one for each mental state. The only difference between
each variant was the manipulation of John's mental state as to the
resulting harm. Because nothing else changed between the variants,
this allowed us to attribute differences in behavior to variations in
mental state.
Every mental state variant of a theme shared the same first and
third sentence. The first sentence always served as an introductory
sentence (e.g., "John is gardening in his backyard, where there are
many plants and many small rocks."), and the third sentence always
presented the resulting harm (e.g., "The rock hits the window, but since
his neighbor's window is made of especially tough glass, the rock
bounces off and causes no harm."). The second sentence was modified
in each variant in order to introduce the scenario-specific mental state
for a given theme (e.g., "Wanting to get rid of a small rock, he throws
the rock over the fence, aware that there is a substantial risk that the
rock will also hit his neighbor's nearby window, but choosing to ignore
it.").30 Thus, within each theme there were five scenarios: one each for
purposeful, knowing, reckless, negligent, and blameless. We created
thirty themes, ten in each of three harm-level categories, giving us a
total of one hundred and fifty unique scenarios. 31 To ensure that
subjects could not easily learn the nature of our manipulations, we
systematically rotated the mental state signals across scenarios. 32 As
we discuss in Part III, this approach did not allow us to determine
whether particular signals were related to subject behavior-that is,
whether a particular signal contributed to higher or lower accuracy in
mental state identification.

29. While the nature of the harm was heterogeneous across scenarios, the resulting harm
was classified into one of three categories: high harm (causing death or serious physical injury);
medium harm (causing minor injury or great property damage); and low harm (causing no injury
or minor property damage).
30. All scenarios were constructed so that they would have roughly the same total number
of words. Scenario length was seventy-three words, plus or minus two words.
31. For the full set of scenarios, see infra Appendix B.
32. We also "counterbalanced" the presentation of mental state signals across the three harm
levels. That is, subjects did not see all the scenarios and respective mental states in the same order.
Rather, we also used randomization in presenting scenarios to mitigate against any foreseeable
order effects.
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Several experiments were run in the original study, but we focus
here on the version of the experiment in which subjects had full access
to the mental states definitions throughout the experiment. As noted
above, one problem with some of the earlier research on this topic was
that the design had subjects assess the same fact pattern multiple
times, only changing the mental state of the fact pattern across trials.
Doing so would have made it clear to the observant participant that the
actor's mental state was being manipulated on each trial. To avoid this
problem in our experiments, subjects saw a given fact pattern only once.
Therefore, each subject read thirty of the total one hundred and fifty
scenarios, six from each of the five mental states, and one, randomly
assigned, from each theme. 33 In the rating experiments, after reading
each scenario subjects were asked: "On a scale from 0-9, with 0 being
no punishment and 9 being extreme punishment, how much should
John be punished for his behavior?" 34
The original study found that punishment ratings were highest
for purposeful action. At the other end of the spectrum, blameless
punishment averages were the lowest, and negligent averages were the
second lowest. 35 In the middle, punishment for K and R was generally
less than P and more than N. These results show not only that subjects
33.
Subjects also were given five practice scenarios, one from each mental state and spanning
the approximate range of harms, before the actual experiment, in order to familiarize them with
the interface and the experimental task. These practice themes were developed in addition to the
thirty themes used in the actual experiment.
34. In the original study and in this Article, when asked to rate punishment, subjects were
given a 0-to-9 scale. We used text next to the numbers on the scale to communicate to subjects that
0 reflected no punishment and 9 reflected the most extreme punishment. In each study, we used
a series of anchoring scenarios to introduce participants to the range of harms they would see
during the experiment. The reported analysis standardized punishment ratings to control for the
possibility that subjects likely had different understandings of the type of punishment associated
with each number. Moreover, as an additional check, we ran a separate experiment in which we
asked subjects (after they completed the punishment task) to provide us with a description of their
personal scale, i.e., what type of punishment did they associate with the number one, five, and so
forth. We found these subjective punishment scales to show a large amount of concordance across
individuals.
It is important to recognize that research in moral psychology has found that individuals
may assign blame differently than they assign punishment. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Outcome Severity and Judgments of "Responsibility": A Meta-Analytic Review, 30 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2575, 2580 (2006) (discussing the variety of outcome variables that researchers have
used to measure responsibility judgments). To account for this possibility, we ran a set of blamerating experiments, identical to the punishment rating experiments, except for a change in the
rating question asked. Thus, we reran experiments one, two, three, and five with a focus on blame
rather than punishment. In these additional experiments, subjects were asked, after reading each
scenario: "On a scale from 0-9, with 0 being not at all blameworthy and 9 being extremely
blameworthy, how blameworthy is John for his behavior?" The results from the blame-rating
experiments followed the same pattern as the punishment-rating experiments we discuss in the
text.
35.
Shen et al., supra note 3, at 1337-44.
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punished in these categories in accord with the normative suppositions
reflected in the MPC but also that subjects were very good at
distinguishing these three categories of mental states from one another,
even if they were not explicitly identifying the mental state of the actor
in their evaluations of each scenario. However, subjects did not
demonstrate differentiation of their punishment ratings at the junction
between K and R. K was often punished no differently, or even less
harshly, than R, a result not at all in keeping with the MPC's
hierarchical assumptions.
Why didn't we see, even when we gave subjects the MPC
definitions, higher punishment ratings for K scenarios than for R
scenarios? There are at least two plausible explanations. First, it could
be that subjects are capable of identifying a conceptual difference
between knowing and reckless action but employ a moral calculus in
which knowing and reckless actors are punished roughly the same. If
this is the case, then the subjects' behavior focuses attention on the
normative question of whether causing harm knowingly is indeed more
culpable than causing harm recklessly.36
This deep normative question is beyond the more limited scope
of the present empirical investigation, but a brief discussion of the
MPC's normative presuppositions is warranted. Although the MPC
often distinguishes between knowing and reckless action for the
purpose of defining culpability, there are surprisingly few instances
where the drafters of the MPC employed categorical differences
between K and R for result elements of offenses. 37 For example, murder

36. In the original study, we ran versions of the experiment in which we asked subjects how
much "blame" (as opposed to punishment) they would assign to the scenario protagonist. The
results for the blame and punishment results were substantively similar, and to ease the
presentation of results we described punishment ratings as reflecting subjects' assessments of
moral culpability. As the original study recognized, however, blame and punishment are not
synonymous. Two equally blameworthy individuals may be punished differently (by subjects and
by the criminal justice system) on the basis of other utilitarian considerations such as
incapacitation or deterrence. Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty that a difference in
punishment ratings (or an absence of a difference) is due to a difference in subject assessment of
moral culpability. This caveat aside, however, other empirical studies have demonstrated that
punishment ratings are primarily driven by retributive notions of justice. E.g., Kevin M.
Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Punishment, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL
Soc. PSYCHOL. 437 (2006).
37.
See Robinson & Grall, supra note 2, at 723-24 (noting that the Model Penal Code refers
to, but does not define, result and circumstance elements, and plausibly suggesting that result
elements should be defined as circumstances changed by the actor, for example, causing a death
in homicide or causing a fire in arson). Result elements are the consequence of one's actions (such
as the death of the victim) that the state must prove the defendant brought about. For many
offenses, the state must also, or instead, prove that one or more circumstance elements obtain (for
example, that the package in the defendant's possession contains illegal drugs). There are not
many pure result offenses in the MPC.
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and aggravated assault include causing the result purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life. A key feature of many extreme indifference
cases is heightened probability of causing the harm, thereby blending
into K. In other result offenses, the offense is typically punishable at
the same level for P, K, and R if the forbidden result occurs. 38
A second possible explanation for the subjects' failure to
distinguish between K and R in their punishment ratings is that they
are simply confused when trying to make the distinction. That is,
subjects would punish K and R differently if they could identify the
difference in mental states, but they cannot.
One experiment in our original study attempted to address this
difference between subjects' ability to sort the mental states and their
normative treatment of those states once sorted. Subjects were provided
with the definitions of the mental states alongside each scenario and
were instructed, "Please select from the question options below the
definition that best matches John's mental state in this scenario." This
allowed us to determine, for each mental state, subjects' ability to
correctly classify the mental state of the actor in the scenario in terms
of the MPC hierarchy.
The results suggested that subjects could identify purposeful
and blameless scenarios with a high degree of accuracy. Subjects
correctly identified purposeful scenarios 78% of the time and correctly
identified blameless scenarios 88% of the time. Subjects were most
likely to err in the middle categories of knowing (50% success rate),
reckless (40% success rate), and negligent (48% success rate).
This low level of accuracy in identifying knowing and reckless
mental states made it difficult to know which of our two proposed
mechanisms explained the punishment ratings, but it was clear that we
could not rule out the possibility that subjects simply couldn't
distinguish the two mental states-and that this could explain the
indistinguishable punishment ratings.39
38. Take, as an example, the crime of burglary in the second degree (inflicting harm during
a burglary), MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2)(a) (1962), and the crime of cruelty to animals, id. §
250.11. In both cases the MPC does not create gradations between P, K, and R. One
counterexample is "causing catastrophe"-which is a second-degree felony if committed with P or
K, but third degree if committed with R. Id. § 220.2(1). In this case, however, there may be a
significant moral difference between knowing that a catastrophic result will occur and knowing
that there is a real but small chance that it will. This offense probably should have included
extreme recklessness ("eR") cases in the second-degree felony.
39. We also ran a final experiment combining sorting and rating. We designed this
experiment to test whether exposing subjects to the sorting task first may result in punishment
differences, perhaps due to better appreciation of the mental state gradations. This design also
allowed us to test whether those who were better able to identify mental states showed greater
differentiation in punishment ratings, particularly at the K/R boundary. To test this, we had
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The original study thus suggested that jury-eligible subjects
cannot distinguish between knowing, reckless, and negligent conduct
with great accuracy. But the study also left open the possibility that
this accuracy could be improved by refining the language used to define
the MPC mental states and to signal them in the research scenarios.
The research team therefore set out to investigate whether improving
the language of mens rea could improve the ability of subjects to
recognize, sort, and rate these mental states as expected.
III.

NEW EXPERIMENTS: DESCRIPTION & RESULTS

A. Three New Experiments
The results of the original study were premised on the
assumption that the scenario protagonist's mental state was clearly
signaled to subjects and that the mental state categories that the
scenarios were being sorted into were clearly defined. This assumption
allowed us to interpret the failure to distinguish between knowing and
reckless scenarios as the subjects' failure. But it is possible that the
original results were sensitive to the way we defined or communicated
the mental states.
Language might have mattered in three possible ways. First, the
MPC definitions provided to subjects might not have been clear enough.
Second, the specific language used in the scenarios to communicate
mental states might have had a substantial effect on how individuals
interpreted the scenarios. Third, the reckless signals in particular may
not have properly conveyed the substance of the category as intended
by the MPC drafters. We designed three new experiments to address
these three possibilities.
1. Revised MPC Definitions Experiment
Essential to
definitions provided
knowing, reckless,
formulation of the

both the sorting and the rating tasks were the
to subjects for the five mental states (purposeful,
negligent, and blameless). Would a different
MPC mental states definitions produce more

subjects first sort fifteen scenarios according to MPC definitions. These same subjects were then
asked to rate fifteen different scenarios. The results from this experiment indicated that sorting
the scenarios first did not materially change the punishment ratings these same subjects provided.
Additionally, limiting the analysis of the punishment ratings task to only those who sorted with
above 75% accuracy, there remains no significant difference in punishment ratings at the K/R
boundary. Thus, even those who seem to be better able to utilize and understand the
knowing/reckless distinction still fail to make a clear moral distinction between the two. The same
is true for the "bad sorters" (i.e., subjects with overall accuracy below 50%).
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accurate sorting and more differentiation in punishment, especially in
the knowing and reckless scenarios? To find out, we ran a new
experiment in which we modified the MPC definitions provided to
subjects. Table 1 compares the original and new definitions. 40
Because they were clearly the categories that subjects struggled
with the most, we focused our revisions on the three middle categories:
knowing (50% accurate in original study), reckless (40% accurate), and
negligent (48% accurate).4 1
The Model Penal Code emphasizes that the main difference
between knowing and reckless behavior is the actor's perceived
probability of risk. 4 2 In the original experiment, we established this
difference in perceived risk by telling subjects that a person acts
"knowingly" when he is aware that his conduct is practicallycertain to
cause the result, and that a person acts "recklessly" when he is
conscious of a substantial risk that a result will occur. Thus, the
difference in probability was that between practically certain and
substantial risk. This tracks the language used in the MPC. 4 3
Also tracking the MPC, in the original study, we told subjects
that a person acts "knowingly" when he is aware that his conduct is
practically certain to cause the result but that a person acts "recklessly"
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustified risk that
a result will occur or that a circumstance exists. The addition of the
"consciously disregards" language was problematic because it may have
erroneously suggested to subjects that such a conscious choice was not
an element of knowing action. Knowing action also, of course, requires
an actor to consciously disregard a risk-indeed, an even greater riskthat his actions will cause the harmful result.44 By removing the
40. The study design-in which subjects read through thirty scenarios-requires
parsimonious communication of the protagonist's mental state. In revising definitions, we aimed
to further improve the clarity of the signals while maintaining this parsimony. This desire for
parsimony, as well as the need to isolate the differences between scenarios, prevented us from
developing more elaborate fact patterns in which each mental state is communicated primarily
through circumstantial evidence and not through the signaling words alone. Future research can
investigate the extent to which alternative research designs do a better (or worse) job at
communicating mental states if they convey information in a way that more closely matches the
types of evidence available at trial.
41. We also edited the blameless definition to improve clarity, as "lacked any of the culpable
mental states" was ambiguous and could mean "lacked just one of the mental states," not "lacked
all of them."
See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §2.02 cmt. at 236-37 (1985).
42.
43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
44. An alternative would have been to insert a choice clause into the knowing scenarios, but
this would have been more cumbersome, and, at least anecdotally, the "consciously disregard"
language could have generated even more confusion. In addition, this change had the added
advantage of removing what seems a priori a negatively valenced word ("disregard"), which, when
compared to the more positive word "knowing," might have contributed to the subjects' confusion.
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"consciously disregards" language from the reckless definition, we more
clearly conveyed to subjects that the primary difference between K and
R was the perceived probability of risk.
Another difference between the original K and R definitions was
the inclusion of the word "unjustified" in the original reckless definition.
Exactly how the dual requirements of substantial and unjustified risk
are meant to operate is ambiguous and has been debated by MPC
commentators.4 5 For our purposes here, the goal was not to settle these
deep normative debates about the proper contours of the reckless
category but rather to operationalize the definition in a simple way that
more clearly differentiated it from the other mental states.46
The same logic led us to remove the word "unjustified" from the
revised definition of negligent. In the original study, we told subjects
that a person acts negligently when, through a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, he fails to
perceive a substantial and unjustified risk that a result will occur or
that a circumstance exists.
In addition to striking the word "unjustified," we made one
further modification to both the reckless and negligent definitions. The
original definitions both referred to a "risk that a result will occur or
that a circumstance exists." This tracks the MPC language, which is
designed to apply both to result and circumstance elements. But
because we focus in this set of studies only on result elements, we
refined the definition and removed the language that referenced
circumstance elements.
Using these new definitions, but without otherwise changing the
experimental design, we ran a Revised MPC Definitions Experiment.4 7

45.

See Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern:A Unified Conceptionof CriminalCulpability,

88 CALIF. L. REV. 931, 933-35 (2000); Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on

Alexander's Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 955, 956-59 (2000);
Simons, supra note 2, at 189-92; David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9
AM. J. CRIM. L. 281, 362-67 (1981).
46. We did not implicate the unjustifiable requirement in the fact patterns used in these
experiments. Rather, in all of the fact patterns (except the blameless ones), the scenario was
deliberately constructed so that the actor's conduct was unjustifiable. Thus, including
"unjustifiable" in some but not all of the culpable mental state definitions would have been an
additional and unnecessary distraction. While the concept of justification is sometimes an
important issue, and the MPC embraces the view that causing a result with a mental state of K is
more difficult to justify than causing a result with a mental state of R, the issues surrounding
justification are not a principal aim of this investigation.
47. Because our question of interest was only whether the above changes, en masse, had an
effect on our experimental results, and not the differential effect of each change, we did not run
multiple experiments for the various manipulations. This limits our ability to causally link any
one definitional change to differences in the punishment ratings or sorting accuracy. Causal
inferences about the effect of a particular phrase should be further investigated if deciding upon a
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We ran both a sorting and a punishment task, with independent
samples, as a part of this experiment. For both tasks, all components of
the experimental design, other than the definitional changes, stayed
the same as in the original study, including all of the text of the
scenarios.4 8 Thus, any difference in sorting or punishment rating can
be attributed to these modifications in the mental states definitions.

single phrase with which to instruct jurors, but our initial research goal here was to see if
improving the set of definitions employed in the experiment could improve sorting accuracy.
48. One additional change concerned the recruitment of subjects. In the original study, we
paid Qualtrics to recruit subjects for us. In the new series of studies, we used Amazon's Mechanical
Turk service to recruit subjects directly. Multiple studies have validated results using Amazon's
Mechanical Turk on a variety of assessments, especially when compared to samples of convenience.
See, e.g., Tara S. Behrend et al., The Viability of Crowdsourcingfor Survey Research, 43 BEHAV.
RES. METHODS 800 (2011); Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for
Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351 (2012); Michael
Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A New Source of
Inexpensive, yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2011); Joseph K. Goodman et
al., Data Collection in a Rat World: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Mechanical Turk Samples,
26 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 213 (2012); Jon Sprouse, A ValidationofAmazon MechanicalTurk
for the Collection of Acceptability Judgments in Linguistic Theory, 43 BEHAv. RES. 155 (2011).
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Table 1: Definitions Used in Original Study and
-

T

r,

rnr

1. rurpose1uny: -Aperson acts
"purposefully" when his conscious
objective is to cause the specific result.
2. Knowingly: A person acts
"knowingly" when he is aware that his
conduct is practically certain to cause
the result.
3. Recklessly: A person acts "recklessly"
when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustified risk that a
result will occur or that a circumstance
exists.
4. Negligently: A person acts
"negligently" when, through a gross
deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would
exercise, he fails to perceive a
substantial and unjustified risk that a
result will occur or that a circumstance
exists.
5. Blamelessly: A person is "blameless"
even though he may have caused harm,
if he lacked any of the culpable mental
states defined above,

in-nn+

149

1. rurpose1uny: IA-person acts
"purposefully" with respect to a result
when his conscious objective is to
cause the snecific result.
2. Knowingly: A person acts
"knowingly" with respect to a result
when he is aware that his conduct is
practically certain to cause the result.
3. Recklessly: A person acts
"recklessly" with respect to a result
when he is aware of a substantial risk
that his conduct will cause the result.
4. Negligently: A person acts
negligently" with respect to a result
when, through a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable
person would exercise, he fails to
perceive a substantial risk that his
conduct will cause the result.
5. Blamelessly: A person acts
"blamelessly when he does not have
any of the culpable mental states
defined above.

2. Variation in Signaling Phrases
Signaling mental states requires developing a fact pattern (i.e..
a "theme"), and using words to describe the mental state within that
fact pattern .e., a "scenario"). For the original study, we communicated
John's mental state with regard to the harm being caused in the
following way.

49. In addition to receiving the definitions, subjects were told:
A crime is committed when the defendant has committed a voluntary act prohibited by
law accompanied by a culpable mental state. Voluntary act means an act performed
consciously as a result of effort or determination. Culpable mental state means either
purposefully, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as explained in this instruction.
Proof of the commission of the act alone is not sufficient to prove that the defendant had
the required culpable mental state. The culpable mental state is as much an element of
the crime as the act itself
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If we label harm as the y variable and John's action in the
scenario as the x variable, then within each theme x varies, y remains
constant, and the general relationship between x and y is as follows:
* Purposefully: John decides to cause [or bring about] y by doing x.
* Knowingly: John does x, practically certain that it will result in
y.
* Recklessly: John does x, aware there is a substantial risk that y
will occur.
* Negligently: John does x, failing to perceive a substantial risk
that x may cause y.
* Blamelessly: John does x, and despite being as careful as he could
be, y happens.
The words used above (for P, K, R, and N) to describe the
relationship between mental state (actus reus) and the resulting harm
are words taken fairly directly from the language provided by the MPC
to describe each mental state-for instance, "practically certain"
describing knowing.
One experimental design could strictly adhere to MPC language
by using only these formulations. But using just these MPC signaling
terms creates two problems. The first concerns habituation. If we
exposed subjects to identical signaling language for each mental state,
it's likely that over the course of the experiment (as they spotted that
same word multiple times) they would recognize the phrase as a sort of
code word for the mental state. The second problem is that using only
the MPC formulation leaves us unable to say anything about whether
the MPC language could be improved. For instance, would substituting
"almost positive" for "practically certain" be easier for subjects to
understand? In our new Signal Variant Experiment we modified our
experimental design to allow us to answer such questions.5 0
In the Signal Variant Experiment, we tested the effect of
signaling phrases as follows. First, from the thirty themes used in the
original study, we selected nine themes on the basis of behavioral data
from the original study indicating that subjects were more capable of
accurately parsing the K/R distinction for those themes.5 1 The nine
50. In the original study, five alternatives for each mental state signaling phrase were
developed. But each of the 150 scenarios was assigned one and only one signaling phrase. Because
we did not rotate all five alternative phrases for each scenario, the design did not allow us to
determine whether a particular phrase was more (or less) helpful in allowing subjects to accurately
sort the mental states.
51.
Of our original thirty scenarios, we selected those scenarios where the mean punishment
ratings were higher for the K scenarios as compared to the R scenarios and where the classification
accuracy for both K and R scenarios were above 35% in the classification experiment. We took this
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themes we used included three themes each from our three harm levels
(low, medium, and high). For each theme, we had already developed
(from the original study) five scenarios, one for each mental state. We
dropped the blameless scenario 52 and then created twenty scenarios for
each theme: five signal variants for each of the four mental states. Table
2 illustrates the twenty variations that were generated for a single
theme.
We ran both a sorting task and punishment rating task as part
of the Signal Variant Experiment. In each, subjects were randomly
assigned to read one of these twenty variants for the nine different
scenarios included in the experiment. This allowed us to determine the
extent to which particular signals differentially contributed to the
punishment effects seen in the original study. In addition, by comparing
the results of the sorting and punishment rating tasks, we can tell
whether the differences in sorting accuracy reliably correlate with the
punishment ratings. In other words, do those R signals that are more
likely to be confused with K result in higher punishment, and do those
K signals that are more likely to be confused with R result in lower
punishment?

approach recognizing the possibility that there may have been scenarios in our original experiment
that made the K/R boundary particularly difficult for subjects to grasp. Because these scenariospecific errors are not of greatest interest, we selected those scenarios where the scenario itself
was least likely to drive an effect. Further, due to the sheer number of scenarios that needed to be
written (twenty variants for each scenario), performing the study using all thirty scenarios (six
hundred unique variants in total) was impractical. These two filters isolated eleven candidate
scenarios and we selected three scenarios from each harm level, leaving us with the nine scenarios
used in the present study. This selection process did have the effect of creating a K/R punishment
difference across the group where one did not exist in the full set of thirty scenarios. The difference
was minor but significant. For this reason we compare the punishment difference between K and
R in Experiment 3 to the results from Experiment 2 (where a marginal punishment difference was
present) as opposed to our original results (where no punishment difference was present).
52. Unlike the other mental states, the pertinent facts in the blameless scenarios were much
more dependent on the context provided beyond the signaling language than other scenarios-for
example, a gust of wind or an unforeseen natural event. This made it nearly impossible to create
multiple variants of a blameless scenario just by changing the signaling language. Even though
we no longer included blameless scenarios, we kept a blameless scenario in the anchoring
'practice" questions provided at the start of the survey, and we also kept blameless as an answer
choice in the sorting tasks. This allows for meaningful comparison between the various studies.
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3. Revised Recklessness Experiment
A third modification of the original study concerns the
construction of the recklessness signaling phrases (Table 3). The most
significant concern was the inclusion of the choice language attached to
the end of the original signals (e.g., "but chooses to ignore" the risk). As
discussed previously in the context of the MPC definitions, this
language, which was not included in the knowing signals, may have
contributed to the K/R confusion. To make our signaling language
consistent with the revised definitions, we removed the "but chooses to
ignore" language from our R signals.
In addition, two of the original recklessness signaling phrases"realizes it is very likely" and "conscious of the likelihood"-may have
communicated too high a probability level, thus conflating them with
knowing.54 Specifically, both signals may have conveyed to the reader
that the result was not only possible but probable. It can be argued,
however, that this level of risk was not consistent with the intent of the
MPC, which only requires the probability of the risk to be "substantial"
in order to reach the threshold for recklessness.
The decision about what words to use for recklessness raises
fundamental questions about what the MPC drafters intended and,
more generally, how judges and commentators understand and apply
the distinction between K and R. We recognize that the meaning of
"substantial" risk is meant to be contextualized in relation to the nature
of the harm; however, at the same time, we think that a relatively low
(though real) probability may be sufficient to establish recklessness,
especially in high-harm cases.55 With this in mind, we adjusted some of
54. In addition, one of our original signals for recklessness inadvertently included the word
"knows" ("knows there is a good chance"). In Experiment 3 we replaced the word "knows" with
'recognizes."
55. This is the position taken in the Colorado Supreme Court case People v. Hall:
Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability because
the magnitude of the harm is potentially great. For example, if a person holds a revolver
with a single bullet in one of the chambers, points the gun at another's head and pulls
the trigger, then the risk of death is substantial even though the odds that death will
result are no better than one in six. . . . Conversely, a relatively high probability that a
very minor harm will occur probably does not involve a "substantial" risk. Thus, in order
to determine whether a risk is substantial, the court must consider both the likelihood
that harm will occur and the magnitude of potential harm, mindful that a risk may be
'substantial" even if the odds of the harm occurring are lower than fifty percent.
999 P.2d 207, 217-18 (Colo. 2000). For further discussion, see Simons, supra note 2, at 189-92.
The Commentary to the Model Penal Code states as follows:
Even substantial risks . . . may be created without recklessness when the actor is
seeking to serve a proper purpose, as when a surgeon performs an operation that he
knows is very likely to be fatal but reasonably thinks to be necessary because the
patient has no other, safer chance. [Footnote 14] . . . Some standard is needed for
determining how substantial and how unjustifiable the risk must be in order to warrant
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the signals meant to convey likelihood in order to communicate the
relatively low probability that we believe is sufficient for a finding of
recklessness. These changes are noted in Table 3. Recognizing that our
conceptualization of what is and what is not recklessness is debatable,
our goal here was to push the lower bounds of the requirements for
recklessness in order to determine whether doing so produces a
separation between subject responses to recklessness and knowledge
scenarios. Because we do not observe such a distinction in the data, we
are not concerned that we might have departed from the canonical
meaning of recklessness in our signaling language.
Whether to eliminate the "choice" language is more complicated
because it opens up the question of the actor's motivation for taking the
risk and whether he had good (possibly justifiable) or understandable
reasons. However, we designed the scenarios so that the actor's reasons
for acting were palpably not good enough to justify taking the risk.
As with the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment and the Signal
Variant Experiment, we ran a sorting task and a punishment rating
task as part of the Revised Recklessness Experiment. As before, we
used a different set of subjects to perform the two tasks.

a finding of culpability. There is no way to state this value judgment that does not beg
the question in the last analysis; the point is that the jury must evaluate the actor's
conduct and determine whether it should be condemned. The Code proposes, therefore,
that this difficulty be accepted frankly, and that the jury be asked to measure the
substantiality and unjustifiability of the risk by asking whether its disregard, given the
actor's perceptions, involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a lawabiding person in the actor's situation would observe.
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 237 & n.14 (1985). Footnote 14 states, in
part: "On the other hand, less substantial risks might suffice for liability if there is no pretense of
any justification for running the risk." Id. at 237 n. 14.
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Table 3: Comparison of Phrasing in Original Study and in the

Aware there is a substantial risk that
[the harm will occur], but chooses to

Aware there is a substantial risk that
[the harm will occur].

ignore fit/the risk1.
Realizes it is very likely that [the harm
will occur], but decides to [act] anyway.
Conscious of the likelihood that [the
harm will occur], but simply doesn't
care.
Understands that [the harm could easily
happen], but decides to risk it.
Knows there is a good chance that [the
harm will occur], but chooses to [act]

Realizes there is some risk that [the
harm will occur].
Conscious of the real risk that [the harm
will occur].
Understands that [the harm could easily
happen].
Recognizing there is a good chance that
[the harm will occur].

anyway.

B. Experimental Methods
The three experiments discussed in the previous section were
conducted in a similar way to our original study. Each subject who
participated in an experiment was asked to read a series of short
scenarios and answer a single question about the scenario's protagonist
after each one. As noted above, for Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 we
utilized a selected subset of nine themes, and for Experiment 1 we
utilized the entire original set of thirty themes.
The experiments were conducted between December 2012 and
May 2013.56 We used a web-based experimental platform called
Qualtrics. Research using Qualtrics-based experiments has been
published and presented in a number of academic fields, suggesting
that it meets scholarly expectations for quality online web-based
experiments.5 7

56. The University of Minnesota Institutional Review Board Human Subjects Committee
determined that the study was exempt from review under federal guidelines. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.101(b)(2) (2014). The study, Study No. 1211E24181, is on file with the authors.
57. Studies relying on Qualtrics experiments include Jonathan S. Abramowitz et al.,

Obsessive Compulsive Symptoms: The Contribution of Obsessional Beliefs and Experiential
Avoidance, 23 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 160, 162 (2009); Yany Gr6goire et al., When Customer Love
Turns into Lasting Hate: The Effects of Relationship Strength and Time on CustomerRevenge and
Avoidance, 73 J. MARKETING 18, 21 (November 2009); and Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility
of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 2004 (2010).
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All subjects were recruited via modest, market-rate payments
made available through Amazon Mechanical Turk's payment service.5 8
Separate samples were recruited for each experiment. No personally
identifying information was collected. Studies assessing the quality of
Turk subjects have found them to be engaged by the online
experimental stimuli and to be more representative than the
convenience samples that would otherwise be used.5 9 As discussed in
more detail in Appendix B, filtering questions were used to ensure that
subjects were actively participating throughout the course of the
experiment.
All subjects recruited were self-reported United States citizens
age eighteen to sixty-five. The number of subjects for each experiment,
reported in Table 4, allowed sufficient statistical power to robustly test
our hypotheses. At the end of the experiment, we collected demographic
information from subjects. Table Al, located in Appendix A, shows
these results. While not a truly nationally representative sample, the
1,613 subjects who participated in the experiments came from all 50
states, Washington, D.C., American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. Our sample was roughly equal in terms of gender, with
52% of subjects being female and 48% male. Our subjects were younger
on average than the comparable U.S. population. Our sample was 77%
white, about equivalent to the national average. In terms of education,
our subjects are slightly skewed toward having more education. Income
distributions of our subjects and the U.S. population as a whole are
similar, though not identical.

la. Revised IVFU Delinitions Experiment - Sorting
lb. Revised MPC Definitions Experiment - Punishment
2a. Signal Variant Experiment - Sorting

96
94
531

2b. Signal Variant Experiment - Punishment
3a. Revised Recklessness Experiment - Sorting
3b. Revised Recklessness Experiment - Punishment

509
186

TOTAL SUBJECTS, ACROSS ALL EXPERIMENTS

197

1, 613

58. No personally identifying information was collected aside from a thirteen-character ID
number provided by the worker for the purposes of tracking survey completion, obtaining payment,
and preventing the same individual from completing the same or related surveys.
59. See supra note 48.
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C. Results
In this Section we report on the results from each of our three
new experiments. Each experiment consists of two subparts: a sorting
task and a punishment rating task. In Appendix A, we provide
additional discussion of the details of the statistical analysis.60
1. Experiment 1: Revised MPC Definitions
The results from the sorting portion of the Revised MPC
Definitions Experiment reveal the same basic pattern found in the
original study: subjects are best at sorting purposeful and blameless
mental states, worst at sorting recklessness, and in the middle with
knowing and negligent mental states. A summary of sorting results is
presented in Table 5, along with a comparison to the results of the
original study.
Although the overall pattern remained the same, accuracy of N
and R did increase in the new study. R improved from 40% to 47%, and
N improved from 48% to 63%. This at least suggests that the new

language may better communicate the distinction between these two
mental states. But subjects in the new study were also less likely to
correctly identify blameless scenarios, dropping from 88% to 78%.
Turning to the punishment task, we find that, even with the
revised MPC definitions, subjects do not significantly differentiate
between K and R in their punishment ratings across the thirty themes.
Purposeful action was punished at 5.7, knowing at 4.9, reckless at 4.8,
negligent at 3.4, and blameless at 1.4. Graphically, Figure 1 (which
bears remarkable resemblance to the similar figure in the original
study) clearly shows that, even with the revised definitions, there is no
significant punishment differentiation between the knowing and
reckless scenarios.

60. In this Section, we use several types of statistical analysis to assist us in drawing
inferences from the data we collected. Using widely accepted methods, we estimate the likelihood
that a difference in the sample means reflects a true difference in the population means. When we
make an inferential statement in the body of the text (e.g., classification accuracy increased), this
indicates that the statistical analysis (details available in Appendix A) indicated that there is a
less than 5% chance that the effect we observed was due to chance. Another way of stating this is
that our presented results are all statistically significant at a p-value of 0.05. This is the
conventional standard for statistical significance in the natural and social sciences. Smaller pvalues indicate a greater certainty that the observed effect is real. Statistical significance is not
the same as legal or policy significance because a statistically significant difference is not
necessarily great in magnitude. Whether an observed effect has legal significance involves policy
and normative questions beyond the statistical test.
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Table 5: Comparing Accuracy of Mental State
Sorting: (A) Revised MPC Definitions Results
and (B) Original Study Results

What to Notice in Table 5: Even with the Revised MPC Definitions, subjects struggle to
differentiate knowing from reckless and reckless from negligent. Subjects continue to
do well at identifying purposeful and blameless actions.
Note: The gray cells in Table 5 display the sorting success rate for each mental state.
The clear cells display the percentage of responses across the other four (incorrect)
options. For instance, looking at the column labeled "Purposeful" in section A, subjects
correctly identified these scenarios 81% of the time; 10% of the time mistook them for
knowing; 5% of the time mistook them for reckless; 4% of the time mistook them for
negligent; and 1% of the time mistook them for blameless.
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Figure 1: Average Punishment Ratings for Scenarios from
Experiment lB ("Revised MPC Definitions, Punishment
Rating")
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What to Notice in Figure 1: Even using the Revised MPC Definitions, the average
punishment ratings for knowing and reckless scenarios cross each other repeatedly,
visually presenting what is confirmed by the statistical analysis discussed in Appendix
A: there is no significant difference between punishment ratings of knowing and
reckless scenarios.
Notes: Data for this figure are from the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment
Punishment Rating task. The y-axis plots average harm rating for each purposeful,
negligent, and blameless scenario in each of thirty themes (averaged across all subjects
who rated the particular scenario). Shading indicates the mental state of the scenario.

2. Experiment 2: Signal Variant Experiment
In the next two experiments we tested the effects of changing
the language used in our scenarios on sorting accuracy and punishment
ratings. Specifically, in the Signal Variant Experiment we identified
higher-accuracy and lower-accuracy variants of our signal for
recklessness. Then, in the Revised Recklessness Experiment, we
replaced the lower-accuracy language with revised phrases aimed at
improving sorting and punishment differentiation.
Starting with the Signal Variant Experiment, our analysis
revealed a robust effect of signaling language on subjects' ability to
accurately identify reckless scenarios (Table 6). The results show that
the R signals cleanly divided into two higher-accuracy R signals and
three lower-accuracy R signals. The two higher accuracy signals were
"understands that [the harm could easily happen], but decides to risk

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1354

[Vol. 67:5:1327

it" (54% correct) and "aware there is a substantial risk that [the harm

will occur], but chooses to ignore [it/the risk]" (52% correct). The three
lower accuracy signals were "realizes it is very likely that [the harm will
occur], but decides to [act] anyway" (42% correct), "conscious of the
likelihood that [the harm will occur], but simply doesn't care" (39%
correct), and "knows there is a good chance that [the harm will occur],
but chooses to [act] anyway" (39% correct).
The results suggest that some words can better communicate
recklessness than others. But even with the improved sorting results,
our analysis revealed no statistically significant difference in
punishment ratings across the various signals that we used to
communicate the reckless mental state.
To further examine the nature of the relationship, we asked
whether there was a significant correlation between an R signal's
likelihood of being misinterpreted as a K signal and the mean
punishment rating assigned to that signal. We found no correlation
between these two factors.

1. Understands that
hanen], but decides to
risk it.
2. Aware there is a substantial risk that [the harm will occur], but
chooses to ignore [it/the risk].

Less Accurate R Signals:3. Realizes it is very likely that [the harm will occur], but decides to
[act] anyway.
4. Conscious of the likelihood that [the harm will occur], but simply
doesn't care.
5. Knows there is a good chance that [the harm will occur], but chooses

52%

Accullrate
42%
39%
39%

to [act] anyway.

3. Experiment 3: Revised Recklessness Experiment
The Revised Recklessness Experiment utilized the modified
mental states definitions (as used in the two experiments just
described) and also modified the signals for recklessness, as presented
in Table 3. In brief, we modified the recklessness language by removing
the choice language, which had been present in R signals but not K
signals, and by reducing the probability of risk communicated in certain
signals.
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As presented in Table 7, we found that the adjustments to our R
signals produced a marked improvement in sorting accuracy. The
improvements in sorting accuracy were not limited to the R scenarios.
The changes also seemed to improve our participants' ability to
understand the K/R and R/N boundaries, as indicated by robustly
improved classification of the K and N mental states as well (see Figure
2). This is despite no changes being made to how we communicated
either of these mental states between Experiments 2 and 3.
We also investigated whether the changes we made to the
signaling language-which resulted in higher sorting accuracy-were
accompanied by other changes in the way subjects classified the various
scenarios. For instance, it is possible that improvement in sorting
accuracy for R scenarios is associated with an increase in the instances
where subjects misidentify R scenarios as N scenarios while reducing
instances where subjects misidentify R scenarios as K scenarios.
Comparing the results from the Revised Recklessness
Experiment with the results using the Original Reckless Definitions
Experiment, we found that there was no statistically significant
difference in the breakdown of incorrect responses for the P and R
mental states. There was, however, a significant difference in the
distribution for the K and N mental states. This difference is driven by
an increase in subjects misclassifying K scenarios as R in the Revised
Recklessness Experiment, an increase in subjects misclassifying N
scenarios as B, and a decrease in subjects misclassifying N scenarios as
K or R. In sum, when we do see a statistically significant difference, we
see subjects more frequently classifying scenarios into less culpable
mental states as a result of our changes to the language of recklessness.
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Table 7: Change in Sorting Accuracy of Recklessness:
Prn

''a

Aware there is a substantial
risk that [the harm will occur],
but chooses to ignore [it/the
risk].
Realizes it is very likely that
[the harm will occur], but
decides to [act] anyway.
Conscious of the likelihood
that [the harm will occur], but
simply doesn't care.
Understands that [the harm
could easily happen], but
decides to risk it.
Knows there is a good chance
that [the harm will occur], but

chooses to [act] anyway.

-9 A

yn

'v

n4 1r1A

52%

Aware there is a
substantial risk that
[the harm will occur].

42%

Realizes there is
some risk that [the
harm will occur].

70%
(+28***)

Conscious of the real
risk that [the harm
will occur].
Understands that
[the harm could
easily happen].

53%

39%

54%

39%

Recognizes there is
a good chance that

[the harm will occur].

65%

(+13)

(+14*
52%
(-2)
560

(+17*)

Notes: Table 7 compares the ability of participants to accurately classify scenarios when
using the original reckless signals and when using the modified reckless signals (see
Table 3). Aside from changes to the signaling language, no other changes were made to
the scenarios or study design between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. The number in
parentheses in the fourth column notes the change in sorting accuracy in terms of
absolute percentage points. *= Stat. Sig. at p < 0.05; *** = Stat. Sig at p < 0.0005.

What to Notice in Table 7: Reducing the communicated probability (e.g., from "very
likely" to "some risk" and from "likelihood" to "real risk") improved the ability of
participants to accurately identify the mental state. Further, removing the term
"know," which might have further confused participants, from one of the reckless
indicators also resulted in an improvement in sorting accuracy for that signal. While it
is true that we also removed "choice language," the improvements we see are not even
across the board, as would be expected if the improvements were due to the removal of
such language. In fact, we only see statistically significant improvements on those
signals that implement the modified probability language. This is strong evidence that
removing the choice language was not a primary causal factor in the improvement we
see in sorting accuracy.
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Figure 2: Sorting Accuracy in Original Study, Revised MPC
Definitions Experiment, and Revised Recklessness Experiment
nas ns

Notes: The above figure presents the sorting accuracy for the culpable mental states
across three experiments: the original study ("2011 Study"') and the sorting components
of the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment ("Exp. 1 -Improved Defs.") and the Revised
Recklessness Experiment ("Exp 3 -Improved Defs. & Reckless Signals"). We denote the
significance of the change between the original study and Revised MPC Definitions
Experiment over the middle column bars in each cluster. We denote the significance of
the change between the Revised Recklessness Experiment and the Revised MPC
Definitions Experiment over the third column bars in each cluster. ns = p > 0.05;*=
Stat. Sig. at p < 0.05; *** = Stat. Sig. at p < 0.0005.
What to Notice in Figure 2:- This figure visualizes the net improvement that the various
changes implemented to our paradigm revealed. Alterations to the mental state
definitions result in modest improvements to R sorting accuracy and robust
improvements to N sorting accuracy. We did not see substantial improvement to the
various mental state categories until adjusting the language used to communicate
recklessness to participants. Notably, this change not only improved sorting accuracy
for R but for K and N as well. This is despite no alterations being made to these signals
between the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment and the Revised Recklessness
Experiment.

In the punishment rating task for the Revised Recklessness
Experiment, we found no significant difference in the punishment
ratings that subjects assess when employing the revised signals.
We then tested whether the improvement in

sorting accuracy

was followed by a greater separation in punishment ratings for K and
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R scenarios. In other words, now that participants can better
differentiate K and R scenarios, do they change the relative
punishments assessed to K and R scenarios? We find that there is no
change in the relative punishments given to R and K variants of the
nine themes.
IV. DISCUSSION
There are both practical and theoretical implications from our
results. At a practical level, the results offer concrete, if preliminary,
guidance to courts and legislatures when constructing mental states
definitions. While the mental states will likely always be difficult for a
lay juror to grasp, we show that this confusion can be mitigated through
careful word choice.
The results also contribute to an ongoing scholarly debate about
the utility of the MPC's present construction of its mental state
categories. We argue in this Part that our new results, while not yet
dispositive, give strong support to the conclusions that lay subjects can,
under the right conditions, see a distinction between knowing and
reckless conduct causing harmful results, but that they typically fail to
see a corresponding distinction in moral culpability.

A. Improving Sorting by Improving the Language of Recklessness
In our original study, we wrote that, if the distinction between
knowing and reckless behavior is to have import in the criminal law,
"legislatures and courts will have to do a better job of articulating it in
their codes and jury instructions." 6 1 We also noted that, because our
original study was "but one set of experiments in a young-indeed
almost nonexistent-empirical literature," caution and additional study
was needed. 62 One concern was that the language we used to define the
several mental states and then to communicate these mental states in
the scenarios could have been improved.
Our new results demonstrate that, indeed, the original language
could be improved. By modifying the language of recklessness in the
new experiments, we were able to bring about significant improvements
to participants' sorting accuracy.
These results suggest that legal actors should not be cavalier in
describing mental states. Small differences in wording-as evidenced

61.
62.

Shen et al., supra note 3, at 1347.
Id. at 1344.
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in all of our experiments-can produce significant changes in
perception of the mental state. 63
While we can offer a general recommendation that the language
be scrutinized, it is not yet clear exactly which words should be used in
a particular context and what level of accuracy should be expected. The
underlying question remains a normative one: What is the nature of the
risk that makes it appropriate for one to be deemed criminally reckless?
Although the drafters of the MPC clearly meant for "substantial"
to be interpreted contextually, we believe that they intended that a
perceived probability of harm much less than 50% would suffice, at least
in high harm cases.64 Such a threshold of culpable risk creation is
widely accepted and quite defensible in the types of factual scenarios
used in our experiments-where the actor is aware of a genuine risk
and creates or takes the risk without any morally plausible
justification. Based on these observations, it became clear that certain
words and phrases used in the original study communicated
recklessness in a manner that materially contributed to lower
classification accuracy by the participants.
Classification accuracy may be the goal of the sorting
experiment, but courts must weigh competing concerns. For instance,
experimenters might develop language that generates clearer
distinctions between knowing and reckless conduct but in doing so may
create a separation that is not consistent with the intent of the Code.
Whether the MPC should be revised to improve subjects' ability to make
distinctions or whether the confusion should instead be accepted as a
necessary consequence of deliberately flexible definitions is a question
beyond the scope of this Article.
Our results suggest that changing language can improve
sorting, but they also suggest that those improvements are limited.
Even in our best case, only 59% of subjects are accurately identifying R
scenarios. More than one out of every three times they read a reckless
scenario, subjects fail to identify it as such. About 70% of these
misidentifications are subjects believing that an R scenario
demonstrates knowing conduct on the part of the protagonist. We are
still left with the basic conclusion we reached in the original study:
laypeople have great difficulty identifying and distinguishing reckless
and knowing behavior. If jurors cannot reliably distinguish between the
two, on what basis are they deciding whether a defendant charged with
murder acted knowingly or recklessly?
63. Additional research can investigate whether K/R accuracy can be further improved
through more drastic changes to the experimental design. What if, for instance, subjects engaged
in a short training exercise before reading and rating the scenarios?
64. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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B. PunishmentRatings Are Unaffected by Improved Sorting
Despite the improvements in classification accuracy for the R
mental state scenarios, we did not observe a statistically significant
change in punishment ratings for the R mental state as compared with
the K mental state. That our subjects improved their sorting, but did
not similarly adjust their punishment ratings, lends support to the
argument that we see the conflation of K and R punishment because
subjects do not see a clear moral distinction between the K and R
mental states, at least as it concerns the result element of offenses.
Two results particularly support this conclusion. First, as
presented in Figure 2, we find that the propensity for an R signal to be
misinterpreted as a K signal makes no impact on how subjects punish
the scenarios containing that signal. This indicates that subjects do not
reliably distinguish their punishment ratings even when perceiving a
difference between the reckless and knowing mental states.
The results from Experiment 3 provide further support for this
proposition. In Experiment 3, we saw significant and robust
improvements in R classification accuracy, but subjects continued to
demonstrate almost no difference in how they punish (1) cases in which
they are told that the actor consciously took a significant risk that a
victim would be harmed, with no semblance of a justificatory motivation
for doing so, and the harm actually occurs; and (2) otherwise identical
cases in which they are told that the actor knew that the harmful
outcome was "practically certain" to occur.
What implications does this finding have for the law? The
answer is not straightforward. Though the drafters of the MPC
expressly adopted the K/R distinction and used it extensively in
defining the mens rea for circumstance elements of criminal offenses,
they rarely graded "result" crimes (i.e., offenses defined as engaging in
conduct that causes specific harms) so as to punish knowingly causing
the result more than doing so recklessly.6 5 There is, however, one
important exception to this pattern: the grading of homicide 66 (and a
parallel distinction in assault6 7 ). Under the MPC and in virtually every
state, a knowing murder (often called second-degree murder) is
classified as significantly more serious than a reckless murder (often
called manslaughter). If jurors see little or no moral distinction between
the two, why does the law?
65. In other result offenses (of which there are not very many in the MPC), the offense is
typically punishable at the same level for P, K, and R. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2)(a)
(1962) (inflicting harm during a burglary); id. § 250.11 (cruelty to animals).
66. Id. § 210.2.

67. Id. § 211.1(2).
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A partial explanation for this puzzle may lie in the fact that the
MPC and the law of most states also recognize a mental state in
addition to the standard PKRN hierarchy, typically called "extreme
recklessness ("eR")," that is generally treated as demonstrating a level
of culpability commensurate with acts committed purposely or
knowingly. 68 The effect of this additional mental state is to add a new
moral gradient to differentiate R behavior from these more culpable
mental states. While our studies have indicated that subjects do not see
a moral distinction between K and R, it remains to be seen whether they
are able to distinguish between R and eR. Of course, even if subjects
were able to differentiate between R and eR, whether the eR mental
state is a workable concept in practice depends on the extent to which
juries are actually instructed on extreme recklessness in homicide cases
and on how clearly the moral line between ordinary recklessness and
extreme recklessness is defined. 69 We intend to explore these moral
judgments in subsequent studies, including an effort to create scenarios
that draw a reasonably defensible and reliable distinction between
cases of "extreme" recklessness and "ordinary" recklessness.

C. Study Limitations
As in our previous work, we recognize that the implications of
the experiments are limited in important ways by our experimental
design.70

First, as with our original study, we cannot generalize beyond
the online experimental context, which we continue to employ. It may
be that jurors, when collectively deliberating, will understand and
behave differently than when they are individually asked to render a
punishment decision. Moreover, we cannot predict in any given case
how the much richer set of facts (and their presentation through
testimony and argument) will affect juror decision-making. Mock jury
studies focusing on the attribution of mental states seem a promising

68. Id. § 210.2(1)(b) ("[Criminal homicide constitutes murder when] it is committed recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."). In addition to
the MPC, extreme indifference murder, sometimes called depraved-heart murder, has been
adopted by most states.
69. In one of our authors' (Morris B. Hoffman) judicial experience, jurors in Colorado murder
cases are rarely instructed on extreme recklessness, while jurors are routinely instructed on
ordinary recklessness as a lesser included offense. This means that the difference between K and
R is having huge effects on the outcomes of these cases because second-degree murder (requiring
K) is punishable by mandatory prison up to forty-eight years while reckless manslaughter may be
punished only by a term of probation.
70. Shen et al., supra note 3, at 1345-46.
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avenue to address these concerns. Postverdict interviews with real
jurors might also be fruitful.
Second, we readily acknowledged in the original study and again
note here that, when mens rea is at issue in an actual case, jurors are
not told what the defendant's mental state is, as they are in our
scenarios. Real jurors must rely on descriptions of the defendant's
conduct and the circumstances under which it occurred to infer mental
states. And rather than receiving a single signal about the mental state,
they will hear conflicting stories from the prosecution and the defense
about what was going on inside the defendant's head during the alleged
commission of the crime. How jurors synthesize this circumstantial
evidence in order to arrive at a conclusion about the defendant's mental
state remains a mystery ripe for further empirical investigation.
Third, we have again limited the focus of our experiments to
result elements of crimes. Our experiments do not address circumstance
elements of a crime-that is, elements having to do with the existence
of a particular existing or historical fact (e.g., whether the property that
defendant possesses is stolen, or whether the person with whom the
defendant has intercourse is younger than sixteen). The results do not
speak to whether people can distinguish between when a wrongdoer
"knew" that a circumstance existed, was aware of a risk that it existed,
or merely "should have known" that it existed. In separate work, we are
now testing the MPC assumptions as they operate for circumstance
elements.
Fourth, our modifications to mental state language do not
address questions about the significance of the fact patterns themselves
and whether laypeople are better at identifying knowing and reckless
action when it arises from a particular type of behavior. In separate
work we are investigating, for instance, whether crimes involving
property damage result in blurring of the K/R boundary to a greater
extent than crimes that result in bodily injury.
Fifth, our definitions and signals have aimed for simplicity-to
isolate a single operative fact that distinguishes each mental state from
the others. Obviously, criminal codes differentiate between mental
states in numerous ways and often depart from the basic MPC five-level
hierarchy. Extreme recklessness is one example that is particularly
pertinent to result offenses.71
Finally, it is worth remembering that, outside the death penalty
context and a few outlier states, judges (not jurors) typically perform
the punishment function. Thus, future research should use a sample of
judges for the punishment rating tasks.
71.

See MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 210.2(1)(b);

id.

§ 211.1(2)(a).
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These limitations serve as an important reminder that the
findings are incomplete and thus inadequate for deriving clear policy
prescriptions. It has been said that "replication is the best statistic,"
and only with replication and further extensions of this work can it
serve policymakers and courts in their specific formulation of mens

rea. 72
V. CONCLUSION

The fairness, utility, and effectiveness of the criminal justice
system hinges on how well jurors can understand and apply the mens
rea categories. Yet the mens rea categories are notoriously difficult to
conceptualize and define, even for experts. Every day the subtleties of
those categories used in most jurisdictions must be explained to jurors.
And every day the effectiveness of those explanations remains
uncertain.
It is vitally important that the language of mens rea conveys to
actual jurors what the legal system has long assumed it will. Here, we
have demonstrated that specific variations in the phrases used to define
and to communicate criminal mental states can significantly increase
an individual's ability to accurately classify mental states. Yet we also
find that there are limits to the added value of new language. Despite
the substantial changes we made to the language used to communicate
recklessness, subjects continued to be categorically worse at accurately
classifying reckless behavior compared to other mental states.
There are two practical lessons for the legal system. First, when
it comes to communicating mental states, phrasing matters. Courts
should therefore exercise care when considering the appropriate
instruction; subtle variations may have substantial effects. And
empirical legal scholars should provide courts with more data on what
the effects of those variations are likely to be.
Second, our results raise deeper questions about the normative
foundations of the MPC's mental states hierarchy. Improving subject
accuracy in distinguishing between knowing and reckless behavior that
causes harmful results did not translate into corresponding changes in
the relative punishment that subjects would impose on knowing, as
opposed to reckless, acts. Although real-life jurors are not typically
called upon to decide punishment, it is nonetheless troubling that
citizens apparently do not see the clear moral distinction that the MPC
72.

STEVEN J. LUCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL TECHNIQUE 251

(2005) ("Replication does not depend on assumptions about normality, sphericity, or independence.
Replication is not distorted by outliers. Replication is a cornerstone of science. Replication is the
best statistic.").
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presupposes between unjustifiably causing a criminal harm knowingly
or instead recklessly.
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VI. APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL AND STATISTICAL DETAILS
This Appendix provides additional detail on the research design
employed in our study, the statistical procedures used to analyze the
data, and the results of the statistical analyses.

A. The Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon's "Mechanical
Turk." Mechanical Turk is an online service provided by Amazon that
allows individuals and institutions to offer online tasks (called "human
intelligence tasks," or "HITs") to people across the country for pay. This
service provided us with a sample that, while not truly nationally
representative,
was substantially
more representative
than
convenience samples that would otherwise be used. In Table Al, we
include the self-reported demographic information of the subjects
included in the analysis.
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Table Al: Demographics of Experimental
Subjects (N = 1613)73
Education

Subjects

Less than HS

1%

18%

High school / GED

11%

30%

Some college

U.S. Census

31%

20%

Assoc. degree

10%

7%

Bachelor's

35%

17%

Graduate Degree

12%

10%

Income

Subjects

U.S. Census

< $20k

32%

$1 to $25k: 22%

$20k - $40k

29%

$25k to $35k: 19%

$40k - $60k

22%

$35k to $50k: 21%

$60k - $80k

10%

$50k to $65k: 14%

$80k - $100k

5%

$65k to $75k: 6%

> $100k

3%

$75k to $100k: 8%

Gender

Subjects

U".S. Census

Male

48% (42-56%)

49%

Female

52% (44-58%)

51%

-Age Groups

Subjects

U.S. Census

18-24

22% (16-28%)

13%

25-34

42% (35-48%)

18%

35-44

20% (14-25%)

19%

45-59

13% (9-18%)

27%

60 +

4% (1-7%)

23%

Race

Subjects

U.S. Census

White

770

740

Non-White

23%

26%

Yes
No

910o (90-145o)

91% (86-95%)

73. Some demographic information was only collected on a subset of the surveys. In those
instances, we provide a bootstrap estimate of the 95% confidence interval for the population
estimate to the right of the breakdown for the reported cases. If no range is provided, then that
demographic data was collected from all 1,613 participants.
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In the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment, we used
approximately the same number of subjects as we used in comparable
experiments in our original study. In the Signal Variant Experiment,
we increased the number of subjects to account for the reduced number
of observations per subject (since we were using nine themes instead of
thirty), as well as the decrease in the expected effect size. We then
reduced our sample size for the Revised Recklessness Experiment
because, unlike the Signal Variant Experiment, we were not testing the
differential effect of signaling language across four different mental
states. Our statistical power requirements were thus substantially
reduced for the Revised Recklessness Experiment.
Concerns about subjects' compliance with task instructions are
of special concern with online experiments because subjects cannot be
monitored while engaged in the experimental tasks.74 To address this
issue, experimental psychologists have developed "attention filters"
designed to ascertain whether subjects are in fact following instructions
and paying attention to the material being presented to them online. In
each of our experiments, we employed a modified version of the filter
developed by psychologist Daniel Oppenheimer and his colleagues.7 5
The design of the primary attention filter question was such that
users who did not read carefully would see, in large font, a headline
reading "Background Questions on Sources for News" as well as another
large, bold question: "From which of these sources have you received
information in the past month?" A series of check-box options were
provided (e.g., local newspaper, local TV news). Subjects reading
carefully, however, were instructed not to check any of the boxes, but
instead to type "123" into the text box provided.76 In several of our
experiments we deployed an additional attention filter. This filter
presented each subject with a scenario that appeared similar to other
scenarios, except that it directed participants to select a specific
response. The results presented in this Article are based only on those
subjects who were paying attention as assessed by these attention
filters.

74. A filter employed after data collection allowed for the experiment to exclude from the
dataset subjects with duplicate IP addresses.
75. See Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Tom Meyvis & Nicolas Davidenko, Instructional
ManipulationChecks: Detecting Satisficingto Increase StatisticalPower, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 867, 867-68 (2009) (describing a filter in which subjects must carefully read instructions
which, counter to the boldface headline above the instructions, tell subjects not to actually click on
an answer to the question).
76. Across the five experiments, 87% of subjects successfully answered the attention filter
question.
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B. The Experimental Paradigm
For the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment, the experimental
paradigm remained largely unchanged from the original paradigm used
in the original study and described in Section II.B above. There were,
however, two changes to note. First, we transitioned to using
participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk instead of
Qualtrics-recruited panels. Second, as discussed in the main text, we
modified the MPC definitions (see Table 1). In brief, we crafted thirty
distinct fact patterns and five variants of each fact pattern. The five
variants served to manipulate the mental state of the actor in each
scenario but nothing else. Participants saw only one of the five variants
for each fact pattern and saw all fact patterns once. Therefore,
participants saw thirty different fact patterns in total. The fact patterns
were presented to participants in a pseudorandomized order.
For the Signal Variant Experiment and the Revised
Recklessness Experiment, we used a modified version of this
experimental paradigm. The primary modification was that for each
fact pattern we crafted twenty variants instead of five. These twenty
variants were comprised of five different signals used to communicate
the four different mental states in the experiment (we did not test the
blameless mental state). Instead of using thirty different fact patterns,
we selected nine fact patterns from the original thirty. We selected
those nine fact patterns where subjects demonstrated the greatest
ability to distinguish the K and R scenarios in the sorting tasks and, on
average, punished K greater than R in the punishment ratings task.
Again, participants were presented with a pseudorandomized order of
the nine stems, seeing no stem twice. Likewise, participants did not see
the same signaling language twice, and the presentation of the mental
states was evenly distributed for each subject.
Upon accepting the HIT on Amazon Mechanical Turk, all
subjects were directed to the survey, which was hosted by Qualtrics.
Before starting the survey, all participants were informed about the
nature of the survey and their rights as participants in the study. At
the start of the survey, we provided all subjects with the instructions
necessary to complete the survey. Aside from changes to the mental
state definitions, these instructions did not change between the three
sorting tasks or the three punishment tasks. All subjects were exposed
to five anchoring scenarios prior to starting the trials; these scenarios
spanned the range of harm and intent that subjects were exposed to in
the trial scenarios. Following the anchoring questions, participants
began rating or sorting the trials of interest. Each trial was presented
on a separate screen. On each screen, subjects were asked to read the
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scenario and then either select a punishment level (in the punishment
rating version) or identify the protagonist's mental state (in the sorting
version). There was no time constraint placed on subjects' responses.
Punishment responses were provided on a 0-to-9 scale, with 0
being no punishment and 9 being the most extreme punishment the
participant personally endorsed. Sorting responses were provided by
participants clicking a radio button next to one of the five mental states
(and accompanying definition). Both punishment and sorting responses
were made at the bottom of the same screen that presented the scenario.
Subjects then had to click another button to advance to the next trial.
At the end of the trials, we presented the instructional manipulation
check, followed by the demographic questions. Finally, subjects were
debriefed and provided with a code to enter into Amazon Mechanical
Turk in order to receive their compensation. We kept a record of each
subject's Mechanical Turk ID in order to ensure that no subject
completed a survey more than once.

C. Details of the Experimental Results
In this section we detail the statistical analyses that support the
inferential conclusions we discuss in the body of the Article.
Starting with the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment, which
tested the sorting accuracy of participants using the revised MPC
definitions, we compared the sorting accuracy with our 2011 results
using pairwise chi-squared tests. For reckless, we found that subjects
using the revised definition were 1.3 times more likely to be correct than
subjects using the original definitions (x 2(l) = 4.26, p < .05). For
negligent, we found that subjects using the revised definitions were 1.8
times more likely to be correct (x 2(l) = 18.93, p < .001). We found no
difference in the knowing condition, and for blameless, subjects using
the revised definitions were 2.1 times more likely to be incorrect
(X2 (l) = 13.30, p <.001).
We then examined the effect of the revised MPC definitions on
punishment ratings. We first examined whether the changes were able
to create a noticeable difference in how knowing and reckless scenarios
were punished. A t-test comparing punishment ratings for knowing and
reckless scenarios across the thirty themes revealed no significant
difference t(29) =.71, p =.23.
In the Signal Variant Experiment we analyzed the effect of
specific signaling language on subjects' ability to properly categorize the
reckless mental state. A logistic regression analysis revealed a robust
effect of signaling language on subjects' ability to accurately identify
the reckless mental state scenarios (X2(4 ) = 21.04, p < 0.001).
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We next analyzed the effect of specific signaling language on how
subjects punish scenarios describing reckless conduct. We ran a twoway ANOVA, with harm level of the scenario as one factor and signal
as the other. This analysis did not reveal a main effect of signal
(F(4,505)= 1.781, p = 0.13 1). As expected, there was a significant main
effect of harm level (F(2,507) = 684.5, p < .0001). There was no
significant
interaction
between
variant
and
harm
level
(F(8,501) = 1.414, p = .188). We also examined whether there was a
correlation between the likelihood that a reckless signal was
misinterpreted as a knowing signal and the punishment rating that
subjects assigned to scenarios using that signal. We found no reliable
correlation (r = 0.24, p = 0.70).
In the Revised Recklessness Experiment, we assessed the effect
of changes to the reckless mental state signals on subjects' sorting
accuracy. We compared the sorting accuracy with the sorting accuracy
in the Signal Variant Experiment using a 2-proportion z-test. The
results are presented in Table 7. We also compared the sorting accuracy
to the sorting accuracy of subjects in our original study as well as in the
Revised MPC Definitions Experiment. All comparisons were made
using a two-proportion z-test. We also examined whether the
improvement in reckless sorting accuracy was accompanied by other
changes to the sorting behavior. To test this, we observed the frequency
of subject responses, broken down by the actual mental state presented
in a scenario, and compared the results between the Signal Variant and
Revised Recklessness Experiments. There was no statistically
significant difference in the breakdown of incorrect responses for the P

(X2 (3 ) = 2.933, p = 0.402) and R (x2 (3 ) = 5.2, p = 0.158) mental states.
There was, however, a significant difference in the distribution for the

K (X2(3) = 9.02, p < 0.05) and N (x2(3) = 9.20, p < 0.05) mental states.

This difference is driven by an increase in subjects misclassifying K
scenarios as R in the Revised Recklessness Experiment, an increase in
subjects misclassifying N scenarios as B, and a decrease in subjects
misclassifying N scenarios as K or R.
We next examined the effect of changes to our reckless signaling
language on punishment ratings. We entered our data into a two-way
ANOVA, with harm level of the scenario as one factor and signal as the
other. This analysis revealed a marginal effect of signal
(F(4,193) = 2.321, p = 0.06). As expected, there was a significant main
effect of harm level (F(2,195) = 173.3, p < .0001). There was no
interaction between variant and harm level (F(8,189) = 0.207, p =.989).
As indicated, we do observe a trend towards significance with the main
effect of signal variant. Post hoc analysis indicates that this trend is the
result of nonsignificantly higher punishment ratings for the "aware
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there is a substantial risk that [the harm will occur]" signal. We also
examined whether our improved reckless signals had an effect on how
subjects punished reckless as compared to knowing behavior. To
accomplish this, we compared the difference in punishment ratings for
the reckless and knowing variants of the nine themes. We found no
reliable difference (t(8) = -1.253, p = .246).
We also combined the data from the Signal Variant and Revised
Recklessness Experiments to test the marginal effects of our other
mental state signals on sorting accuracy and punishment ratings,
respectively. We found no effect of signal on sorting accuracy for P, K,
or N. We performed a separate logistic regression analysis on each
mental state, using signal variant as a categorical independent
variable. This revealed no significant variation in sorting accuracy

across signals for P (x2(4) = 1.731, p = .785), K (x2(4 ) = 4.013, p = .404),
or N (x2 (4) = 8.137, p = .087). We did reveal some differences in
punishment ratings that reached statistical significance. We ran three
distinct two-way ANOVAs, with harm level of the scenario as one factor
and signal as the other, for each of the three mental states. The models
revealed no main effect of signal variant on punishment rating for P
(F(4,1521)= 1.075, p =.367), a marginal effect-that does not reach the
Bonferroni adjusted threshold of p = 0.0167-for K (F(4,1514) = 2.899,
p = 0.021), and a robust effect for N (F(4,1521) = 7.662, p < .0001).
Post hoc analysis of the K mental state variants revealed that
the main effect was driven by a single variant ("Understands that [the
harm] is almost guaranteed to occur"), which subjects punished
marginally less than the others. Post hoc analysis of the N mental state
variants revealed that the effect was driven by higher than average
assessed punishment on scenarios where we describe the act as being
done "carelessly" and lower than average punishments on scenarios
where we describe the act as being done "hurriedly and without noticing
[a risk of harm]."
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VII. APPENDIX B: FULL TEXT OF SCENARIOS
The full text of the scenarios used in the experiments discussed
in this Article are available for download. The text of the scenarios used
in the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment is available at:
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2014/08/GintherRevised-MPC.pdf. The text of the scenarios used in the Signal Variant
and
Revised
Recklessness
Experiments
is
available
at:
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2014/08/GintherSignal-Variant-Experiment.pdf.

